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WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? RESOLVING THE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS OF NON-
COAUTHORS 
 
D. Sean West* 
 
Driven by a fear of making “Swiss cheese” out of movie copyrights, courts have 
consistently rejected any possibility that an actor or director may hold an independent 
copyright interest in his or her movie performance or direction. To justify the exclusion of 
such contributions from the canon of copyright, courts have resorted to redefining the 
constitutional and statutory limits on copyrightable subject matter. While their efforts 
succeed in squeezing out the authorship claims of actors and directors, the collateral 
damage wrought by their new restrictions on what constitutes a “work of authorship” has 
not previously been evaluated. 
In this Comment, I suggest these new doctrines, which are inconsistent with 
foundational principles of copyright law and established case law, ought to be rejected as 
there is no need to fear the authorship claims of actors and directors. The 1976 Copyright 
Act envisions nine circumstances under which one may contribute to a larger work; all 
contribution claims can be resolved within that framework. Furthermore, courts have 
existing gatekeeping doctrines to mitigate their policy fears without altering existing 
copyright law. Copyright claims from those making creative contributions should not drive 
courts to implement ill-conceived novel solutions, thereby distorting collaborative forms 
of authorship, such as movies. Instead, by enforcing traditional copyright doctrines, courts 
can provide the stable framework necessary to facilitate bargaining among the multiple 
authors involved in these complex creative works. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While everyone from the producer and director to casting director, costumer, 
hairstylist, and “best boy” may make creative contributions to a movie, courts consistently 
reject coauthorship claims by anyone whose name does not appear near the top of the 
screen credits.1 The Second and Ninth Circuits, those that hear the majority of copyright 
appeals, have become particularly adept at resolving coauthorship claims based on the 
nature of the contribution the claimant made and the subjective intent of other 
contributors.2 While coauthorship case law has become more developed, courts and 
                                                 
*J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seattle University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful 
insight and feedback provided by Professors Margaret Chon and Robert Cumbow. 
1 See generally Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the 
Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001). 
2 Id. 
WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? 
commentators have left unresolved whether individuals who contribute to works but are 
not coauthors nonetheless have any residual copyright interest.3 
 Courts almost never address the copyright status of contributions to motion pictures 
made by non-coauthors, partially because optimistic plaintiffs fail to include an alternative 
plea to their joint authorship claims.4 However, a small number of recent cases presenting 
the question of whether a contribution to a motion picture can support a copyright interest 
outside of a coauthorship claim have come before the Second and Ninth Circuits.5 Both 
circuits rejected such claims.6 These cases have wrongly been described as “consistent with 
current copyright doctrine”7—they are merely consistent in limiting copyright interest in 
movies to those near the top of the screen credits.8 
The contribution analysis in these circuits’ decisions represent a troubling break 
from established copyright doctrine, and their rationales, if widely adopted, would have 
far-reaching implications for copyright law. While the Second and Ninth Circuits were 
compelled by a fear of making “Swiss cheese of copyrights[,]”9 copyright law was already 
equipped to handle this concern without resorting to the radical reworking of existing 
doctrines. 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000) (copyright interest in 
contributions of one found not to be a coauthor and not addressed by court); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 
195, 205 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright interest in contributions of one found not to be a coauthor and said to be 
“somewhat of a conundrum.”). 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015); Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 
F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2015). 
6 Id. 
7 Diana C. Obradovich, Garcia v. Google: Authorship in Copyright, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 809 
(2016). 
8 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (movie copyright claims are generally limited “to someone at the 
top of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the director, possibly the star, or the 
screenwriter—someone who has artistic control.”). 
9 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 258; Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742. 
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This Comment begins, in Part I, with a review of the types of creative expression 
that give rise to copyright interests before examining, in Part II, how that framework is 
applied to authors who contribute creative expression to another work. As will be shown, 
the copyright status of a contribution is a function of both the nature of the contribution 
and the nature of the contributor’s intention. With three contribution types and three 
contributor intentions recognized by the Copyright Act, nine contribution scenarios 
emerge. 
The Copyright Act expressly addresses all but two of the scenarios in which an 
author contributes to another work.10 When a contributor intends neither to merge his or 
her contribution into a joint work nor to designate his or her contribution a work for hire, 
judges have been left to resolve for themselves the copyright status of separable 
interdependent contributions and inseparable contributions.11 
While resolving questions about separable interdependent contributions have 
presented courts with little trouble, Part III examines the difficulty courts have had in 
resolving questions about inseparable contributions. The Ninth Circuit’s Garcia v. Google 
and the Second Circuit’s 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin decisions are examined in detail, and 
how these decisions alter copyright law to reach their desired outcomes are highlighted. 
Finally, this Comment concludes, in Part IV, with recommendations on how established 
gatekeeping doctrines can be employed to achieve the majority of the desired policy 
outcomes of the Garcia and 16 Casa Duse courts without altering copyright law.  
                                                 
10 See discussion infra Part II. 
11 See discussion infra Part II.D. 
WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? 
I. COPYRIGHTABLE EXPRESSION GENERALLY 
Not all human expression gives rise to copyright interests. While the author of a 
quickly jotted down limerick has a copyright interest in her work, the author of a 
spontaneously composed spoken word poem receives no such interest.12 While the 
recognition of a copyright interest in some expressions and not others may be felt to be 
uneven, it is not unpredictable. Within the vast domain of human expression, the sizable 
zone in which an expression will give rise to a copyright interest is circumscribed by three 
conjunctive definitions: “original,” “work of authorship,” and “fixation.”13 That is to say, 
only expression that constitutes an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium 
receives copyright protection.14 
The first two definitions, originality and work of authorship, address the substance 
a protectable work must possess; the final definition, fixation, addresses the form a 
protectable work must take. 
A.   “Original” 
Originality, despite having been described as “[t]he sine qua non of copyright[,]”15 
is not actually defined in the Copyright Act. The omission of a specific definition was 
intended to “incorporate[,] without change[,] the standard of originality established by the 
courts under the [1909] copyright statute.”16 While the 1909 Copyright Act neither defined 
originality nor required works be original, courts found Congress’s power to recognize 
                                                 
12 See Fritz v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 95, 100 (D. Mass. 1996) (“‘Original’ words spoken 
aloud can be copied (and independently copyrighted) by all, if they have not previously been fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.”) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 
(1903)). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
14 Id. 
15 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
16 Id. at 355 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 120 (1976)). 
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copyright interests limited by the [c]onstitutional requirement that copyright protection 
only be afforded to the works of “[a]uthors[.]”17 
The constitutional requirement of originality is satisfied, and works are considered 
authored, when works are independently created and possess a modicum of creativity.18 
Thus, while originality is a remarkably low threshold, it is still a threshold. Creative 
expression that is a copy of another work and creative expression “in which the creative 
spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent” are excluded from the 
subject matter of copyright by this requirement.19 All other creative expression is regarded 
as original and a work of authorship in the constitutional sense. 
B.   “Work of Authorship” 
 Even though a work may be authored in the constitutional sense, the work must 
also be a “work of authorship” within the meaning of the Copyright Act for a copyright 
interest to be recognized.20 Work of authorship functions as a term of art within the 
Copyright Act, used to identify the subset of constitutionally protectable works that 
Congress chose to extend copyright protection to.21  The phrase “works of authorship” was 
“purposely left undefined” as the Copyright Act’s drafters sought neither to “freeze the 
scope of copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology 
                                                 
17 U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. 
18 See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 358. While the independent creation and modicum of creativity 
requirements are typically evaluated by courts together as part of an inquiry into “originality,” some advocate 
bifurcated the analysis into separate inquiries for originality and creativity. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (“For the sake of clarity, we 
shall use ‘originality’ to mean independent authorship and ‘creativity’ to denote intellectual labor.”). 
19 Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 359. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990). 
21 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51 (1976) (“In using the phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ rather 
than ‘all the writings of the author’ now in section 4 of the [1909] statute, the committee’s purpose is to avoid 
exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field . . . .”). 
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[n]or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional 
intent.”22 
In lieu of a definition, eight broad categories are identified as works of authorship: 
(1) literary works; 
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words; 
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; 
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
(7) sound recordings; and 
(8) architectural works.23 
The example categories are “illustrative and not limitative.”24 Courts have recognized that 
works not falling squarely within one of the categories may still be sufficiently similar or 
analogous to one of the example categories to be considered works of authorship.25 
C.   “Fixation” 
Finally, copyright protection is only extended to those works that are “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated . . . .”26 Fixation is a constitutional requirement. The Constitution 
only grants Congress the authority to extend copyright protection to the “[w]ritings” of 
                                                 
22 Id. This intentional statutory ambiguity aligns with judicial reluctance to narrowly circumscribe what 
qualifies as works of authorship because of the narrowing effect that could be expected to occur if “persons 
trained only to the law [constituted] themselves final judges of” artistic merit. Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“including” definition). 
25 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 53. Compare Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal 
Studies, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982) (Multistate Bar 
Examination is sufficiently similar to enumerated categories to receive copyright protection) with Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) (basketball games are neither “similar 
nor analogous to any of the listed categories”). 
26  § 102(a). 
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authors, thus works must be fixed in a tangible form to be regarded as “[w]ritings” to be 
eligible for protection.27 
Fixation alone, even while producing a tangible object capable of being regarded 
as a writing, would not necessarily produce the writings of an author. For example, a 
bootleg recording of a live musical performance would fix that performance into a 
“writing,” but it would not be the musician-author’s writing. To ensure that only the 
writings of authors are afforded copyright protection, the only fixation recognized under 
the Copyright Act is fixation that occurs “by or under the authority of the author[.]”28  
II. CONTRIBUTIONS AS COPYRIGHTABLE EXPRESSION 
The foundational analysis of whether an expression gives rise to a copyright interest 
is not altered by whether the expression stands alone or is incorporated into a larger work. 
An original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium can give rise to a copyright 
interest even though it is part of larger work.29 However, the contours of a copyright interest 
that may arise is affected by the nature of the contribution and the contributor’s intention 
in making the contribution. 
Three types of contributions are contemplated by the Copyright Act: contributions 
that are separable and independent from a larger work, contributions that are separable but 
interdependent on a larger work, and contributions that are inseparable from a larger 
work.30 These categories are not laid out explicitly in the Copyright Act but are implicit in 
definitions of collective and joint works.31 In the context of motion pictures, interdependent 
                                                 
27 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
28 § 101 (“fixed” definition). 
29 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“collective work” and “joint work” definitions). 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
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contributions may be those like special effects sequences or audio tracks. Although it is 
possible to isolate these elements from the rest of the motion picture, they are dependent 
on the rest of the motion picture for part of their meaning.32 Inseparable contributions may 
be those like the acting performance at issue in Garcia or the directing performance at issue 
in 16 Casa Duse. Such elements cannot be isolated from the rest of the motion picture and 
are thus completely dependent on the motion picture for their meaning.33 
 Additionally, three types of contributor’s intentions are contemplated: a contributor 
may intend to merge his contribution together with the contributions of others, a contributor 
may intend to have another be considered the author of his contribution, or a contributor 
may intend to retain his independent copyright interest in his contribution. Again, these 
intentions are not explicitly laid out in the Copyright Act but are implicit in the definitions 
of collective works, joint works, and works for hire.34 
 As there are three possible contribution types and three possible contributor 
intentions, there are nine permutations for how they might be combined. As demonstrated 
in the matrix below, most of these permutations are explicitly provided for in the Copyright 
Act; however, there are two notable exceptions. Each of these combinations will be 
discussed in turn. 
  
                                                 
32 See F. Jay Dougherty, Not A Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. 
Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 297, 303, 310 (2001) (recognizing that some recordings are capable 
of being regarded as interdependent parts of a motion picture “[b]ecause the music and recordings are capable 
of existing independently from the rest of a film[.]”). 
33 See id. at 297, 303 (recognizing that “[c]inematography is one of the key, inseparable components of 
film authorship” and that “acting involves movement, posture, and gesture, which are analogous to 
copyrightable pantomime or choreography.”). 
34 See § 101 (“collective work,” “joint work,” and “work made for hire” definitions); see also discussion 
infra Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C. 
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Contributors 
intend to merge 
their 
contributions 
Contributor 
intends to have 
another be 
considered the 
author of their 
contribution 
Contributor 
intends neither 
to merge their 
contribution nor 
to have another 
be its author 
Separable 
Independent 
Contribution 
Collective Work 
Each contributor 
is a co-owner of 
copyright in the 
collective work 
but retains sole 
copyright in their 
contribution.35 
Work for Hire 
The entity for 
whom a 
contribution to a 
collective work was 
prepared may be 
considered the 
author. 36 
Collective Work 
Contributor 
retains copyright 
in their 
contribution 
separate from any 
copyright in the 
collective work. 37 
Separable 
Interdependent 
Contribution 
Interdependent 
Joint Work 
Each contributor 
is a co-owner of 
copyright in the 
work. 38 
Work for Hire May 
Apply 
In the context of 
motion pictures, the 
entity who 
commissions an 
interdependent 
contribution may 
be considered its 
author. 39 
Not Addressed by 
Statute 
Strong consensus 
around 
recognizing an 
independent 
copyright interest 
in such 
contributions.40 
Inseparable 
Contribution 
Inseparable Joint 
Work 
Each contributor 
is a co-owner of 
copyright in the 
work. 41 
Work for Hire May 
Apply 
Ambiguity as to 
whether the entity 
who commissions 
an insuperable 
contribution may 
be considered its 
author.42 
Not Addressed by 
Statute 
The issue 
addressed by 
Garcia and 16 
Casa Duse.43 
                                                 
35 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(c). 
36 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b). 
37 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(c). 
38 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a). 
39 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b). 
40 See discussion infra Sections II.D.1. 
41 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a). 
42 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b). 
43 See discussion infra Sections III. 
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A.   Collective Works 
 When a number of contributions, each constituting separate and independent works 
in themselves, are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work, 
as a whole, constitutes an original work of authorship, the resulting work is considered a 
“collective work.”44 The creation of a collective work does not merge the copyright 
interests in the separable independent contributions that comprise the collective work; 
rather, collective works give rise to a new copyright interest that is independent from its 
constituent parts.45 That new copyright interest recognizes the selection and arrangement 
of the constituent parts of a collective work as being itself an act of authorship.46 
If the conditions of joint authorship are fulfilled, contributors to a collective work 
might be considered coauthors of the copyright interest in the selection and arrangement 
of the collective work.47 However, since the joint authorship definition does not extend to 
separable independent contributions, each contributor to a collective work would retain the 
copyright interest in their separable independent contributions.48 
B.   Joint Works 
When two or more authors intend “their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole[,]” the resulting work they produce is considered 
a “joint work.”49 Each author of the joint work is a co-owner of the copyright,50 and courts 
                                                 
44 § 101 (“collective work” and “compilation” definitions). 
45 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[I]f the selection and 
arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection.”). 
46 See id. 
47 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“joint work” definition). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1978). 
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traditionally regard all joint authors as possessing equal shares in the ownership of the joint 
work unless an agreement to the contrary has been made.51 
No statutory definitions for “interdependent” or “inseparable” are provided in the 
Copyright Act, but the House Report on the 1976 Act gives novels and paintings as 
examples of inseparable joint works, and the lyrics and melody of a song as an example of 
an interdependent joint work.52 The Copyright Act treats both types of joint works 
identically, and both those who contribute inseparable and separable contributions are 
regarded as authors of the resulting joint work.53  
As coauthors’ equal shares in a work allow them to equally partake in a work’s 
profit, the large financial implications of joint authorship exist in tension with the minimal 
statutory requirements for joint authorship. This tension has, at times, been resolved by the 
introduction of a number of non-statutory tests.54 These tests take a conservative approach 
to defining joint authorship, allowing courts to reject the claims of contributors who are 
not truly thought to be “authors” of the resulting work.55 One such test, focusing on the 
nature of the contribution made by each party claiming coauthorship, is relevant to whether 
contributions may be independently copyrightable. 
The classic formulation of the contribution test, originally proposed by Professor 
Paul Goldstein, requires each coauthor to make a contribution that would be independently 
copyrightable.56 The requirement of independent copyrightability was adopted by the 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 151 (1st Cir. 2015). 
52 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 120. 
53 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“joint work” definition). 
54 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (introduction of “master mind” 
test to deny a contributor to a motion picture joint authorship status). 
55 Id. 
56 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2 (1989). 
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Second and Ninth Circuits, among others.57 The implication of such a test is that 
inseparable contributions, under some circumstances, must be independently 
copyrightable. If inseparable contributions were incapable of being regarded as original 
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, the adoption of an independent 
copyrightability requirement would render half of the joint works definition null.  
C.   Works for Hire 
 When a work is regarded as “made for hire,” the Copyright Act allows a contributor 
of creative expression to designate another to be recognized as the author of that 
expression.58 “Works made for hire” are the only exception to the Copyright Act’s default 
rule that copyright interest initially vests with the originator of copyrightable expression.59 
Commissioners of works may prefer the work for hire arrangement over being assigned the 
copyright interest in a contribution because being regarded as the work’s author from its 
inception eliminates the possibility an original author will assert the right to terminate the 
transfer of copyright interest after 35 years.60  
 Only two categories of works may be regarded as having been made for hire: works 
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment or works 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[O]ur circuit holds that joint 
authorship requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution”); Thomson v. Larson, 
147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he contribution of each joint author must be independently 
copyrightable.”). Although in dicta, the Second Circuit has recently speculated that a copyrightable 
contribution may be sufficient to establish joint authorship, even if the contribution would not be 
independently copyrightable. 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015). 
“Copyrightable” under such a relaxed test appears to be intended as a misnomer for “product of authorship,” 
but it is unclear whether constitutional or statutory conceptions of authorship are intended or how such a test 
would be applied. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:15 (2018). For a discussion of the circuit 
split on this matter, see Jeannette Gunderson, An Unaccountable Familiarity: A Dual Solution to the Problem 
of Theft in Theatrical Productions, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 679–80 (2008). 
58 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1978). 
59 § 201(a)–(b).  
60 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2002). See also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 11.07(E)(2)(c)(iv) (2018). 
WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? 
commissioned for one of nine purposes.61 In the latter case, the parties must “expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire.”62  
Two of the nine purposes that a work for hire may be commissioned for are only 
capable of producing contributions to other works.63 The creators of works commissioned 
for use as a contribution to a collective work or as a part of a motion picture can designate 
their contributions as works for hire.64 The inclusion of contributions in the work for hire 
doctrine is significant because the doctrine only affects the person regarded as the author 
of a work, not what is recognized as a work under the Copyright Act. Therefore, the 
inclusion of contributions signals an understanding that some contributions may 
themselves be works. 
Separable independent contributions are explicitly included in the work for hire 
framework by its reference to contributions to collective works.65 Interdependent 
contributions and inseparable contributions are also implicitly included in the work for hire 
framework by its reference to contributions to motion pictures. To prevent “work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work” from being mere surplusage, it must be understood as applying to different types of 
contributions than those considered contributions to collective works; that is, it must refer 
                                                 
61 § 101 (“work made for hire” definition). The nine purposes a work for hire may be commissioned for 
are: (1) as a contribution to a collective work, (2) as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, (3) 
as a translation, (4) as a supplementary work, (5) as a compilation, (6) as an instructional text, (7) as a test, 
(8) as answer material for a test, or (9) as an atlas. Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). For example, “work specially ordered or commissioned for . . . use as an 
atlas” may be intended as either a standalone work or as a part of another work. 
64 Id. 
65 Collective works must be comprised of contributions capable of being regarded as “separate and 
independent works in themselves[.]” § 101 (“collective work” definition). 
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to contributions that do not constitute “separate and independent works in themselves[.]”66 
This means the work for hire doctrine applies to separable interdependent contributions to 
movies, inseparable contributions to movies, or both types of contributions to movies. 
Interdependent contributions to movies were clearly understood by the House 
Report on the 1976 Act as capable of being “parts” of a movie. Motion pictures were listed 
in the report, along with the words and music of a song, as examples of interdependent 
joint works.67  The classification of movies as interdependent works that can be neatly 
segmented into interdependent parts appears to have its roots in the House’s attempts to 
allay the concerns of writers and musicians whose scripts and scores were being used in 
movies.68 While interdependent contributions should be recognized as component parts of 
a movie, regarding movies as only being the products of their interdependent scripts and 
scores denies the real, often inseparable, contributions made by others. 
Inseparable contributions to motion pictures are also recognized, albeit indirectly, 
by the House Report on the 1976 Act as capable of being “parts” of a movie.69 While 
motion pictures are spoken of as interdependent works, elsewhere the report recognizes the 
act of directing as being an act of authorship.70 The directing of a live football broadcast, 
involving the creative expression of framing and selecting shots, left the Report drafters 
with “little doubt” that the director was engaged in an act of authorship.71 Directing cannot 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 120. In contrast, novels and paintings are provided as examples of 
inseparable joint works. 
68 See id. (“The definition of ‘joint works’ has prompted some concern lest it be construed as converting 
the authors of previously written works, such as plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a motion picture 
in which their work is incorporated.”). 
69 See id. at 52. 
70 See generally id. 
71 Id. at 52 (“When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a director guiding 
the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic images are sent out to the public 
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be considered less a work of authorship in the context of motion pictures than in the context 
of football broadcasts. 
Courts and the Copyright Office72 also have not followed the House Report’s 
limited understanding of movies as being only comprised of interdependent parts. The 
Copyright Office recognizes, in the context of joint works, that motion pictures can be the 
product of either interdependent or inseparable contributions.73 Acting performances are 
specifically recognized as a type of inseparable contribution that can make one a joint 
author of a movie.74 Similarly, courts have recognized that a motion picture can be a joint 
work comprised of the inseparable contributions made by actors and directors.75 
Only one reason exists as to why the parts of a motion picture should be conceived 
of differently in the context of joint works than in the context of works for hire: While the 
joint works definition speaks of the “contributions” made by each coauthor,76 the work for 
hire definition speaks of a “work” commissioned for use as part of a motion picture.77 
However, any difference between a contribution and a work is effectively collapsed by the 
imposition of a joint authorship test that requires each coauthor’s contribution to be 
                                                 
and in what order, there is little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes 
‘authorship.’”). 
72 See generally UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY, 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (Apr. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/59KC-JQU5]. 
73 Brief in Response to Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at appx., ADD47, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 
F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12–57302) (Letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Assoc. Register of Copyrights and 
Dir. of Registration Policy and Practices, U.S. Copyright Office, to M. Cris Armenta, The Armenta Law Firm 
(Mar. 6, 2014)).  
74 Id. 
75 See, e.g., 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 258 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The director of a film 
may, of course, be the sole or joint author of that film, such that she or he can secure copyright protection 
for the work”); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the coauthor 
of a motion picture may be “someone at the top of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes 
the director, possibly the star, or the screenwriter—someone who has artistic control.”). 
76 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“joint work” definition). 
77 See  § 101 (“work made for hire” definition). 
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independently copyrightable.78 Therefore, consistency requires applying the work for hire 
doctrine to both interdependent and inseparable parts of motion pictures. 
D.   Unaddressed Situations 
Two pairings of contribution type and contributor intention are not addressed 
directly by the Copyright Act. When a contributor intends neither to merge their 
contribution with the contributions of others nor to have another considered the author of 
their contribution, the copyright status of separable interdependent contributions and 
inseparable contributions are unclear. While a strong copyright norm has coalesced around 
the treatment of separable interdependent contributions, courts have struggled to resolve 
the question of inseparable contributions. 
1. Independent interests in separable interdependent contributions 
 While independent copyright interests in separable interdependent contributions are 
not addressed in the Copyright Act, courts and parties routinely recognize independent 
copyright interests in such contributions.79 The failure of courts or litigants to raise this 
issue demonstrates a strong consensus that, at least in the context of separable 
contributions, the recognition of a copyright interest in copyrightable expression is a 
default position that is undisturbed by statutory silence about a particular context the 
copyrightable expression may be created for. 
 Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen provides an example of how strong this consensus is. 
Effects Associates produced special effects footage for use in the low-budget alien invasion 
movie “The Stuff.”80 When the footage was incorporated in the final film, despite not 
                                                 
78 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
79 See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1990). 
80 Id. at 555–56. 
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having been fully paid for, Effects Associates brought a suit for copyright infringement 
against the director and production company.81 Neither party claimed the motion picture 
was a joint work, and the special effects sequences were found not to be works made for 
hire.82 
 The Effects Assocs. court recognized the interdependent nature of the special effects 
sequences when it observed that the sequences may not have much market value apart from 
the movie they had been commissioned for.83 Despite the interdependent nature of Effects 
Associates’ contribution, their independent copyright interest in the special effects footage 
was not disputed by the defendant or the court.84 
2. Independent interests in inseparable constitutions 
Independent copyright interests in inseparable contributions are also not addressed 
in the Copyright Act, and, as a result, courts and litigants routinely object to recognizing 
independent copyright interests in such contributions.85  However, the rejection of such 
interests sits uneasily with the consensus evident in other contexts—that statutory silence 
causes the copyright interest in works of authorship to fall into the default of vesting with 
the author of the work rather than into oblivion.86 The problematic rationales courts have 
put forward to attempt to exclude inseparable contributions from this default is the subject 
of the next Part. 
                                                 
81 Id. at 556. 
82 Id. at 557. 
83 Id. at 559 (“[I]t remains to be seen whether there’s a market for shots featuring great gobs of alien 
yogurt oozing out of a defunct factory.”). 
84 Id. at 556. 
85 See discussion infra Part III. 
86 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (1978) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author 
or authors of the work.”). See also discussion supra Part II.D.1. 
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III. SWISS CHEESE CASES 
The two circuit cases to address the issue of inseparable contributions, Garcia v. 
Google and 16 Casa Duse, are united by the common fear that the possibility of recognizing 
such interests would “make Swiss cheese of copyrights.”87 Despite this common fear, these 
courts take divergent paths to avoid recognizing such interests. The Garcia court attempts 
to argue that inseparable contributions are not “authored” in the constitutional sense, and 
the 16 Casa Duse court attempts to argue that inseparable contributions are not “works of 
authorship” in the statutory sense.88 Although the courts attempt to characterize their 
treatment of inseparable contributions as consistent with how other works are treated, both 
rationales are inconsistent with the statutory framework and established precedent. 
A.   Garcia v. Google 
In Garcia v. Google an actress claimed an independent copyright interest in her 
“audio-visual dramatic performance” in a film.89 Although a Ninth Circuit panel initially 
found Garcia, the actress claiming the copyright interest, likely to succeed on the merits of 
her claim,90 an en banc panel later reached the opposite conclusion.91 
Cindy Lee Garcia responded to a casting call for an action-adventure thriller titled 
Desert Warrior in July 2011.92 As a result, she was ultimately cast in a small part that 
required her to deliver two lines and “seem[ ] concerned.”93 Garcia, who never signed a 
                                                 
87 See 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 258 (2d Cir. 2015); Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 
733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015). 
88  See discussion infra Parts III.A and III.B. 
89 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 738. 
90 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 933–36 (9th Cir. 2014), on reh’g en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
91 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740–44. 
92 Id. at 737. 
93 Id. 
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work for hire agreement, was paid $500 for her performance, which was filmed over four 
days.94 
 Although Desert Warrior was never completed, five seconds of Garcia’s 
performance recorded for the movie were incorporated into a new short film entitled 
Innocence of Muslims.95 Far from the action-adventure thriller Garcia auditioned for, 
Innocence of Muslims is an anti-Islam polemic that depicts the Prophet Mohammed as, 
among other things, a murderer, pedophile, and homosexual.96 While Garcia’s performance 
is displayed in Innocence of Muslims, her original lines were dubbed over with a voice 
asking, “Is your Mohammed a child molester?”97 
After Innocence of Muslims was posted on YouTube, the video-sharing website 
owned by Google, in June 2012, the film was translated into Arabic and “fomented outrage 
across the Middle East[.]” 98 The film is purported to have played a role in inciting the 
September 11, 2012, attack on the United States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.99 Shortly 
after the Benghazi attack, an Egyptian cleric issued a fatwa against anyone associated with 
Innocence of Muslims, and Garcia received multiple death threats.100 
 Seeking to minimize the film’s visibility online, Garcia ultimately filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California naming Google and the 
film’s director as co-defendants.101 Garcia alleged copyright infringement against both 
                                                 
94 Garcia, 766 F.3d at 936. An agreement, purported to be signed by Garcia that transferred all her rights 
in her performance to the film’s producers, was introduced in the district court but Garcia challenged its 
authenticity; the district court didn’t address the agreement or its authenticity. Id. at 936 n.5. 
95 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2015). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 737–38. 
99 Id. at 738. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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defendants and moved for a temporary restraining order; specifically, she sought to enjoin 
Google from hosting Innocence of Muslims on YouTube or other Google-run websites.102 
The district court ultimately denied Garcia’s motion for a preliminary injunction, relying, 
in part, on its conclusion that Garcia failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits 
of her copyright infringement claim.103 
Initially, a divided Ninth Circuit panel found Garcia likely to succeed on her 
copyright infringement claim;104 however, after the Ninth Circuit reviewed Garcia’s claim 
en banc, the court then reversed its initial holding.105 The en banc court found Garcia’s 
copyright claim unlikely to succeed for two reasons, either of which would be sufficient 
on its own: Garcia’s performance was not a “work of authorship,” and Garcia’s 
performance was not fixed by her or under her authority.106 
1. Constitutional authorship 
While Garcia claimed her acting performance as a work of authorship because it 
manifested “some minimal level of creativity or originality,” the en banc court rejected that 
standard.107 The court turned to its earlier decision in Aalmuhammed v. Lee as a “useful 
foundation” for evaluating Garcia’s claims on this point.108 The court held that, as in 
Aalmuhammed, such a low bar for defining works of authorship must be rejected because 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 940 (9th Cir. 2014), on reh’g en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
105 Id. at 740–44. 
106 Id. at 742–44. 
107 Id. at 742. 
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it “would be too broad and indeterminate to be useful” and would “fragment copyright 
protection” of movies and other large creative projects.109 
While the court was clear about both the standard it rejects and the fear prompting 
that rejection, the court ultimately failed to articulate the work of authorship definition 
Garcia’s claim should be evaluated under. Instead, the court concluded its rejection of 
Garcia’s acting performance as a work of authorship with the policy statement that 
“Garcia’s theory of copyright law would result in the legal morass we warned against in 
Aalmuhammed.”110 The failure to articulate a work of authorship definition can be read as 
the court’s categorical exclusion of acting performances from qualifying as works of 
authorship. 
Unfortunately, Aalmuhammed served as a very weak foundation for an evaluation 
of Garcia’s copyright claims, as the en banc opinion got Aalmuhammed’s facts, holdings, 
and policy concerns wrong. The en banc court characterized Aalmuhammed as a case that 
examined the definition of what constituted a “work” for purposes of the Copyright Act; 
however, the real issue at stake was the definition of “joint work.”111 Jefri Aalmuhammed, 
a consultant working on the movie The Autobiography of Malcolm X, claimed joint 
authorship of the movie based on his contributions to the film.112 Accepting 
Aalmuhammed’s claims as true, since the issue was before the court on motion for 
summary judgment, the court recognized that Aalmuhammed’s rewriting of several 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 742. 
111 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000). 
112 Id. at 1229–30. 
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passages of dialogue and creating an original scene constituted “works” that were 
independently copyrightable.113 
Having misunderstood the issue before the court in Aalmuhammed, the Garcia en 
banc court correctly credited Aalmuhammed as defining a “work” based upon “some 
minimal level of creativity or originality . . . too broad and indeterminate to be useful.”114 
Although the en banc opinion did not indicate any abridgement of its Aalmuhammed quote, 
Aalmuhammed actually held that such a definition “would be too broad and indeterminate 
to be useful if applied to determine who are ‘[joint] authors’ of a movie.”115 Far from 
rejecting the minimal level of creativity standard for determining when something may be 
considered a work of authorship, the Aalmuhammed court explicitly affirmed the minimal 
level of creativity test as the applicable standard in most, if not all, contexts outside of joint 
authorship claims.116 
The en banc court also misstated the policy concerns of the Aalmuhammed court.117 
Although the en banc court stated Aalmuhammed warned about the legal morass of 
splintering a movie into many different works,118 no party in Aalmuhammed attempted to 
claim part of The Autobiography of Malcolm X as an independent work. 119 All parties 
agreed their contributions merged into a single work; it was the status of that undivided 
interest that was at issue.120 
                                                 
113 Id. at 1231. 
114 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015). 
115 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233 (emphasis added). 
116 Id. at 1232. 
117 See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742. 
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119 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232. 
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Aalmuhammed, correctly read, clearly calls for the application of, and not the 
rejection of, the minimal level of creativity test to Garcia’s claim. Applying that test, it is 
hard to argue that an acting performance is so devoid of creativity as to render it not a work 
of authorship in the constitutional sense.121 No analysis of acting performances as statutory 
works of authorship was presented by the Garcia court, but the fixation requirement was 
also held to bar Garcia’s claim.122 
2. Fixation 
The Garcia court found firmer analytical footing when it applied the fixation 
requirement, as the court clearly articulated the standard it applied.123 As fixation must 
occur “by or under the authority of the author” for a copyright interest to be recognized,124 
the court first evaluated whether Garcia was an author. In defining “author,” the court noted 
that “[a]ccording to the Supreme Court, ‘the author is the party who actually creates the 
work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to 
copyright protection.’”125 Finding that “Garcia did nothing of the sort,” the court held she 
was not an author and thus was incapable of satisfying the fixation requirement.126 
Despite having adopted an author definition that would categorically exclude 
Garcia, the en banc court also held that Innocence of Muslims was not fixed “by or under 
                                                 
121 See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2014), on reh’g en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th 
Cir. 2015) (stating that an actor’s creative embodiment of her role includes “body language, facial expression 
and reactions to other actors and elements of a scene.”). 
122 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743–44. 
123 Id. Although the court cites to 17 U.S.C. § 101 as the source of the fixation requirement, only the 
definition of fixation is found there. As noted earlier, the fixation requirement is found in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
124 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010). 
125 Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989)). 
126 Id. 
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[Garcia’s] authority.”127 The court reasoned that fixation could not have occurred under 
Garcia’s authority because “Garcia claims that she never agreed to the film’s ultimate 
rendition or how she was portrayed in Innocence of Muslims.”128 
In its fixation analysis, the en banc court’s reasoning again suffered from the 
truncation of quoted precedent. The Supreme Court’s holding that “the author is the party 
who actually creates the work” is prefaced with the introductory clause: “As a general 
rule[.]”129 By omitting this qualification, the en banc opinion converted a default rule into 
an absolute. 
“Author” cannot have such an absolute definition though, as the fixation 
requirement is satisfied when a work is embodied “by or under the authority of the 
author.”130 An absolute requirement that an author be the party who translates an idea into 
a fixed form would render the statutory language that a work may be fixed “under the 
authority of the author” a nullity. The inadequacy of the en banc court’s author definition 
was recognized by the court when it went on to evaluate whether Garcia’s performance 
might be considered as fixed under her authority, despite already holding she was not an 
author.131 
 The court’s reasoning on whether Garcia’s performance was fixed under her 
authority was also flawed, as it improperly weighed Garcia’s claim of fraud and evaluated 
the wrong work.132 A party who induced Garcia to allow fixation of her performance under 
                                                 
127 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
128 Id. 
129 Reid, 490 U.S. at 737 (“As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that 
is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection. § 102.”). 
130 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
131 See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 743–44. 
132 See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 744. 
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her authority would be estopped from later claiming their fraudulent inducement vitiated 
her consent, rendering the fixation as not being under her authority.133 However, the 
question of fraud may not ultimately be relevant to Garcia’s fixation claim when the proper 
work is considered.  
Although Innocence of Muslims was the film that Garcia claimed infringed her 
copyright, Innocence of Muslims is not the film Garcia would argue was fixed under her 
authority. A proper analysis of the fixation question must regard Innocence of Muslims as 
a derivative work of the aborted Desert Warrior film; therefore, any fraud involved in the 
production of Innocence of Muslims would not properly enter a fixation analysis. 
Unlike the work of authorship requirement, where precedent clearly favors 
recognizing Garcia’s acting performance as a work of authorship in the constructional 
sense, the fixation requirement, properly analyzed, does not necessarily favor Garcia. A 
full analysis of Garcia’s fixation claim is beyond the scope of this Comment,134 but it is 
important to consider how both the court’s work of authorship analysis and fixation 
analysis are deeply flawed. The source of these flaws seems apparent: the court was not 
engaged in the application of precedent as much as the application of policy. 
B.   16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin 
In 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, a director claimed an independent copyright 
interest in his directorial contributions to a film.135 The Second Circuit, in a panel decision, 
                                                 
133 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 894 (2nd 1979). 
134 Such an argument is made by Judge Kozinski in dissent, relying heavily on the Register of Copyrights 
being a signatory to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances treaty that provides that “performers” 
have the “exclusive right of authorizing . . . the fixation of their unfixed performances.” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 
751 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
135 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 255 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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upheld the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the director’s copyright 
claim.136 In rejecting the director’s copyright claim, the court echoed the Garcia court’s 
fear of “[making] Swiss cheese of copyrights”137 and, as with the analysis presented in 
Garcia, that fear was, at times, allowed to stand in the place of consistent legal reasoning. 
After the production company, 16 Casa Duse, LLC, acquired the rights to a 
screenplay entitled Heads Up, it engaged Alex Merkin to direct a short film based on the 
screenplay.138 Prior to filming, Merkin and all other crew members were asked to sign 
agreements stating 16 Casa Duse would “engage the services [of the cast or crew member] 
as ‘work for hire’ of an independent contractor. . . .”139 Merkin, alone, did not sign the 
requested agreement.140 Although Merkin acknowledged receipt of the agreement, he did 
not return a signed agreement at that time and did not respond to three later requests from 
16 Casa Duse to execute the agreement.141  
Despite 16 Casa Duse’s failure to execute a work-for-hire agreement with Merkin, 
it allowed the production to go forward with Merkin acting as director.142 During the three 
days of shooting, “Merkin performed his role as director by advising and instructing the 
film’s cast and crew on matters ranging from camera angles and lighting, to wardrobe and 
makeup, to the actors’ dialogue and movement.”143 After shooting concluded, 16 Casa 
Duse and Merkin continued to work together on the project.144 
                                                 
136 Id. at 259. 
137 Id. at 258 (quoting Garcia, 786 F.3d at 742). 
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16 Casa Duse engaged Merkin to edit the raw film footage, and the parties entered 
into a “Media Agreement” under which Merkin would edit but not license, sell, or copy 
the footage for any purpose without the permission of 16 Casa Duse.145 Over the next five 
months, the parties negotiated proposed alterations to the Media Agreement and abelated 
work-for-hire agreement, but their negotiations and relationship deteriorated.146 
Finally, Merkin purported to deny 16 Casa Duse permission to “use [his] work in 
any edit without [his] involvement[,]” and Merkin threatened to contact film festivals to 
inform them that 16 Casa Duse lacked rights to the film if 16 Casa Duse finished the short 
film without his involvement.147 When Merkin followed through on his threat, causing the 
New York Film Academy to cancel a screening of Heads Up, 16 Casa Duse filed an action 
seeking, in part, a declaratory judgment that Merkin did not possess any copyright interest 
in the film.148 
1. Statutory authorship 
The court rejected Merkin’s claimed copyright interest in his directorial 
contribution.149 While the court appeared to assume Merkin’s contribution met the 
constitutional threshold of originality, the court found his contribution failed to meet the 
statutory “work of authorship” threshold.150 Directorial contributions, being non-
freestanding, were held not to be “works of authorship” and thus not capable of supporting 
                                                 
145 Id. at 252. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 253. 
149 Id. at 256–59. 
150 Id. 
WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? 
a copyright claim.151 The court found this position to be supported by the Copyright Act’s 
example list of works of authorship, definitions, and history.152 
a. Statutory examples of works of authorship 
No references to contributions appear in the Copyright Act’s list of example works 
of authorship,153 and the court found this to be a meaningful omission.154 Although the list 
is recognized as non-exhaustive, the examples given by the Copyright Act nonetheless 
represent a limit, albeit a fuzzy one, on what may be considered copyrightable subject 
matter.155 The 16 Casa Duse court attempted to police this fuzzy boundary by listening for 
discordant notes and held that categories of creative efforts not “similar [ ]or analogous to 
any of the listed categories” are unlikely to be themselves regarded as works of 
authorship.156 
While the court moved directly from stating the need to compare claimed works to 
the example works of authorship, implicit in the court’s analysis, although 
unacknowledged in its opinion, was an understanding that creative efforts must first be 
extrapolated into abstractions before they can be compared for anything other than literal 
similarity.157 This process of abstraction was what the court engaged in when it sought to 
identify some feature common to all the example works; a feature which, in turn, other 
                                                 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 257. 
153 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010). 
154 16 Casa Duse v. Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 256 (2d Cir. 2015). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. (quoting Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
157 The need to create abstractions of works in order to identify non-literal similarities between works 
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Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992); Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
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of evaluating substantial similarity when an infringement claim has been made, abstraction is also necessary 
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creative efforts must also possess to be considered similar to the example works. This is an 
important step to make explicit in the court’s reasoning because how widely or narrowly 
an abstraction of a work is construed and which features are identified as essential to that 
abstraction will determine the results of any later comparisons. 
Although not stated explicitly in these terms, the court identified an essential 
characteristic shared by all of the example works: the example works are not constituent 
parts of other works.158 As this characteristic was identified by the court as being an 
essential one, no creative effort that is a constituent part of another work could be regarded 
as similar to any of the example works. The court concluded its analysis of the example 
works of authorship by stating the example list “suggests that non-freestanding 
contributions to works of authorship are not ordinarily themselves works of authorship.”159 
The sudden pivot from reasoning regarding “contributions” to a holding limited to 
“non-freestanding contributions” can be explained by judicial restraint, but this pivot also 
obfuscates inconsistencies between the court’s reasoning and other provisions of the 
Copyright Act. As the court’s analysis provides no reason to treat freestanding 
contributions differently from non-freestanding contributions, its holding must be regarded 
as supporting the more general proposition that “contributions to works of authorship are 
not ordinarily themselves works of authorship.” Such a broad presumption runs contrary 
to the work for hire doctrine, which applies to “works” commissioned for use “as a 
contribution to a collective work” and “as a part of a motion picture.” 160 
                                                 
158 See 16 Casa Duse, 791 F.3d at 257 (“But the Act lists none of the constituent parts of any of [the 
example works] as ‘works of authorship.’”). 
159 Id. at 257. Although the court draws a distinction between freestanding and non-freestanding 
contributions, no definition for “freestanding” or “non-freestanding” are provided by the court. 
160 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). See also discussion supra Part II.C. 
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If contributions to other works are presumed not to be works themselves, it is 
unclear what, if anything, could be considered a “work” commissioned for use as part of a 
motion picture. The work for hire doctrine cannot itself resolve this contradiction by 
rebutting a presumption that contributions are not considered works in the context of 
movies. This is because the doctrine is only a mechanism for affecting a change in who is 
regarded as the author of a work; not for affecting a change as to what is regarded as a 
work.161 Further inconsistencies with the court’s holding also arise in the context of joint 
and collective works, as became apparent from the court’s analysis of the Copyright Act’s 
definitions of “joint work” and “collective works.”162 
b. Statutory definitions that reference contributions 
 References to contributions appear three times in the Copyright Act’s definition 
section: in the definition for “joint works,” in the definition for “collective work,” and in 
the definition for “work made for hire.”163 The 16 Casa Duse court found support for its 
position in the first two references but failed to address the third.164 
 Under the joint works definition, a joint work is one prepared by multiple authors 
“with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.”165 To the court, the Copyright Act’s failure to describe the 
contribution each coauthor makes as being a “work” suggested that “such inseparable 
contributions are not themselves ‘works of authorship.’”166  
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Again, the sudden pivot from reasoning regarding “contributions” to a holding 
limited to “inseparable contributions” obfuscates problems in the court’s reasoning. As the 
constituent parts of both interdependent and inseparable joint works are described as 
contributions, if the reference to contributions is held to be significant, it must be regarded 
as significant when applied both to interdependent and inseparable contributions. 
Therefore, if the court’s reasoning is applied consistently, both inseparable and 
interdependent contributions would be regarded as “not ordinarily themselves works of 
authorship.” Such a formulation would again render part of the work for hire doctrine a 
nullity. As explained in Part II.C, the language of “work specially ordered or commissioned 
for use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work” would be mere 
surplusage in the work for hire definition unless that language applied to inseparable and 
interdependent contributions to movies. If both inseparable and interdependent 
contributions are not ordinarily works of authorship, it is unclear how a work 
commissioned to be used as part of a motion picture could be considered a work under the 
work for hire doctrine.    
The court next turned to the definition of collective works for support.167 Under the 
collective work definition, a collective work is one that assembles “a number of 
contributions” each of which “[constitutes] separate and independent works in themselves 
. . . .”168 The court read this definition as containing a “requirement that contributions be 
‘separate and independent’ in order to obtain their own copyright protection . . . .”169 That 
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WHO’S AFRAID OF SWISS CHEESE? 
presumed requirement is then held to indicate “that inseparable contributions integrated 
into a single work cannot separately obtain such protection.”170 
While not explicitly stated, the court’s reading of the collective work definition may 
also serve as the basis for the distinction it earlier attempted to draw between non-
freestanding and freestanding contributions. If the reference to contributions that are 
sufficiently separate and independent to constitute works in themselves is taken to rebut 
the normal presumption that contributions are not to be themselves considered works, then 
freestanding contributions may justifiably be treated differently. If this deduction is correct, 
then a freestanding contribution must both be freestanding in terms of fixation and 
freestanding in terms of meaning; in effect, it must be a separate work. 
This distinction is unavailing though as the court’s reading of the collective work 
definition suffers from an association fallacy. Although the Copyright Act requires that a 
collective work be comprised of contributions that constitute separate and independent 
works,171 it does not follow that all expression capable of being recognized as a work must 
be separate and independent. Again, the work for hire doctrine is instructive. As the 
doctrine applies both to works “specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution 
to a collective work” as well as to works “specially ordered or commissioned for use . . . 
as a part of a motion picture,”172 the Copyright Act’s conception of a work cannot be as 
limited as the 16 Casa Duse court concluded. 
c. Reference to motion pictures in the House Report 
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 Finally, the court looked to the legislative history of the Copyright Act for 
support.173 Specifically, the court notes that the House Report on the 1976 Act stated: 
[A] motion picture would normally be a joint rather than a collective work 
with respect to those authors who actually work on the film, although their 
usual status as employees for hire would keep the question of coownership 
from coming up. On the other hand, although a novelist, playwright, or 
songwriter may write a work with the hope or expectation that it will be 
used in a motion picture, this is clearly a case of separate or independent 
authorship rather than one where the basic intention behind the writing of 
the work was for motion picture use. 174 
 
From this, the court concluded that Congress did not intend for contributions to a motion 
picture to qualify for independent copyright interests “unless the motion picture 
incorporates separate, freestanding pieces that independently constitute ‘works of 
authorship.’”175 Such an argument can only be understood as an attempt to justify a desired 
outcome, as it represents a cherry picking of arguments from the House Report that are 
inconsistent with the view of motion pictures the 16 Casa Duse court expresses 
elsewhere.176  
Although joint works may be made up of either interdependent or inseparable 
contributions, the section of the House Report the court quotes from provides motion 
pictures as an example of interdependent works.177 It is only by excluding consideration of 
inseparable contributions that a dichotomy between joint and collective works makes 
sense; as interdependent joint works and collective works share the feature of being made 
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177 See H.R. REP. No. 94–1476, at 120 (1976) (motion pictures are provided as an example of 
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up of separable contributions, the classification of a work as being either joint or collective 
would only be dependent on the relationship the contribution has to the larger work.178 
However, the 16 Casa Duse court takes a more expansive view of motion pictures 
elsewhere, recognizing they can be comprised of both separable and inseparable 
contributions, when it states that a “director of a film may, of course, be the sole or joint 
author of that film.”179 
Alternatively, if the House Report’s dichotomy of motion pictures as being either 
joint or collective works is assumed to encompass inseparable joint works, the quoted 
passage’s reference to the work for hire doctrine would directly conflict with the 16 Casa 
Duse court’s exclusion of contributions from being regarded as works.180 If contributors’ 
“usual status as employees for hire would keep the question of coownership from coming 
up” and contributors are assumed to include those making inseparable contributions, then 
inseparable contributions must be regarded as works or the work for hire doctrine would 
not apply to them.181  
IV. NOTHING TO FEAR 
 In shrinking the subject matter of copyright down to a sufficiently small size so that 
inseparable contributions are no longer within its scope, the Garcia and 16 Casa Duse 
decisions radically alter copyright law: Garcia by raising the originality threshold, and 16 
Casa Duse by excluding all contributions from being considered works.182 Yet, such 
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radical changes are not necessary because the fixation requirement and the doctrine of 
implied licenses can alleviate many of the Swiss cheese fears. 
A.   Fixation as a Gatekeeper 
 Although the Garcia court’s analysis of the fixation requirement was flawed,183 the 
fixation requirement provides future courts a narrower and better-established ground upon 
which to evaluate copyright claims inseparable contributions. Whether authors who intend 
neither to merge their inseparable contributions into a joint work nor to designate their 
inseparable contributions as works for hire authorize the fixation of their contributions such 
that fixation occurs “under their authority” is a question that deserves close scrutiny. The 
resolution of that question is beyond the scope of this Comment, but should courts 
recognize the authorization of fixation under those circumstances as amounting to fixation 
occurring under the contributor’s authority, it does not follow that a contributor would 
necessarily prevail on an infringement claim. One who authorized another to fix their 
inseparable contribution would also likely be found to have granted an implied license for 
the party undertaking the fixation to make use of the contribution. 
B.   Implied Licenses as a Gatekeeper 
While a transfer of copyright ownership must typically be in writing to be 
effective,184 the granting of a non-exclusive license is not regarded as a “transfer of 
copyright ownership.”185 Therefore, while an exclusive license may not be implied from 
conduct, a non-exclusive license may be inferred when a party’s conduct indicates an 
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intention to grant another a license to use its work. Implied licenses to use copyrighted 
works have been recognized by both the Second Circuit186 and the Ninth Circuit.187 
 While resolving claims of copyright interests to inseparable contributions to motion 
pictures on the basis of implied non-exclusive licenses would not keep the copyright 
interest in a motion picture concentrated in a single entity, such an objective is misguided. 
The holes in a movie’s copyright interest should not be feared for their own sake, but 
because of the friction they may cause in the licensing and performance of the motion 
picture. Even though a contributor may retain a copyright interest in his or her contribution, 
an implied license lubricates any friction that holes in a movie’s copyright interest might 
otherwise have caused.188 While producers of motion pictures have non-exclusive licenses 
that allow them to make use of motion pictures, contributors cannot similarly make use of 
motion pictures because even though they still retain a right to their contributions, motion 
pictures are comprised of other elements they are not authorized to make use of. 
Implied licenses would also free courts from the straightjacket of binary interests 
the Garcia and 16 Casa Duse courts contorted themselves into. Instead of having to resolve 
claims of copyright interest in inseparable contributions by resolving the status of all 
                                                 
186 See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (programmer, who coded a program at the 
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potential copyright claims in inseparable contributions, an implied license analysis would 
free courts to make individualized inquiries into the evidence revealing the intent of the 
parties and the scope of any license that is found to exist. 
 Although, as both courts observe,189 implied licenses are not a perfect solution for 
one seeking to concentrate the copyright interest in a movie in a single party, neither court 
provides a reason why courts should rescue parties who fail to contract for the copyright 
interest they desire under the work for hire doctrine. Resolving these claims by finding 
implied licenses would not only prevent the alteration of copyright law, but it would also 
be consistent with courts’ traditional refusal to rescue litigants who failed to contract for 
the copy.  
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